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 We all agree that modern science was 
born somewhere between the 16th century 
and the 18th century. What is more difficult, 
by contrast, is to say exactly what was in-
vented then. For some, it was a philosophi-
cal turning point, a change in the way people 
looked at things. For others it was the inven-
tion of artificial experiment, the increasingly 
widespread use of experiment to the detri-
ment of experience. For others, it was an 
attempt to view the world through mathema-
tics, limiting its ambitions in a sense by only 
describing numerical relationships between 
measurable entities. Finally, for others still, 
the essential thing was the interface with 
the world of technology and the relationship 
with the mechanical world and the world of 
machines. 
In epistemic terms, this could all be 
summed up in a sentence. What modern 
science invented was a way of questioning 
the world, an operational and instrumental 
approach offering a way of coming to grips 
with the world, a means for man to become 
master and owner of nature, as the saying 
goes. You will note that this founding image 
of modern times is based on a double dis-
junction, between subject and the object, 
active and passive, between man and na-
ture on the one hand and between truth and 
contingency, knowledge and opinion and in 
a sense between science and politics on the 
other hand. However, these two disjunctions 
are broadly what is in the balance today. 
 
We also know that a second type of "re-
volution" occurred in the second half of 
the 18th century which was a political and 
a philosophical revolution and also a legal 
and economic revolution - the American 
and French Revolutions for example. This 
change had its origins in the secularization 
of the European powers which began in the 
16th century, which Marcel Gauchet called 
the disillusionment of the world, echoing 
the words of Max Weber. During the 18th 
century, the merchant economy grew, there 
was also a consumer boom in towns and the 
rules governing intellectual property were 
rewritten, contributing to the development 
of free autonomous individuals who liked 
to consider themselves their own masters. 
This is when what Jürgen Habermas termed 
"civil bourgeois society" appeared, a world 
which provides a public forum for debate 
and which intends to be self-governing. 












These two parallel revolutions, scienti-
fic on the one hand and social on the other, 
share some values such as equality, a call 
for rational debate and a duty to justify 
assertions. What they share is also a certain 
vision of progress, a Promethean vision and 
it was supporters of social change who drew 
science into the public and economic arena 
as a full participant in its own right. 
However, the relationship between this 
new science and the deliberative order and 
dialogue is intrinsically contradictory. There 
are two reasons for this. Firstly, science 
claims to have higher knowledge and often 
to be the only one able to provide the truth. 
It therefore can easily set itself apart from 
or above the democratic discussion process. 
Secondly, this type of science usually mani-
fests itself in technologies and in products 
which reach society via the market, i.e. 
without discussion, and these products can 
disturb the balance of nature, threaten indi-
viduals’ lifestyles and lead to dissent. 
From 1800 onwards, the links between 
science, technology, society and democra-
tic control have thus been complex and or-
ganized on the basis of certain convergen-
ces, but also on the basis of what could be 
termed systemic tensions - and these remain 
more of a problem for us today than ever. 
industrial modernity, nation-
states and competition
A century later, the links between science, 
technology, economics, and politics are 
being redefined. From 1870 to the Cold War, 
science was the main focus for the develop- 
ment of economies and state-building, as 
well as for the semi-permanent wars being 
waged by Nations, particularly in Europe. My 
point is that the most fundamental sciences 
then became decisive for industrial develop-
ment - as with underwater telegraphy, orga-
nic chemistry or radio - and also for defence 
policy and population management, which 
had not been the case previously. States 
started investing massively in research and 
higher education. They set up institutes 
(like the Kaiser Wilhelm Gesellschaft or the 
CNRS), national laboratories, metrological 
centres and industry followed suit. 
This integration of sciences into the heart 
both of the state and of economic expan-
sion was of course based on new opportu-
nities offered by laboratory-based science. 
However, it also met the need to manage 
new technological systems which were in-
ner-vating our society. In this new process 
of technological and scientific transforma-
tion of society, which occurred since the end 
of the 19th century, science and the state 
tended to live in symbiosis. More specifical-
ly, during this period science became a sort 
of alter ego for the state, by which I mean 
a way of defining the collective good, imple-











menting it, demonstrating the greatness of 
the nation and also of declaring a common 
neutrality. During this era, science became 
a benchmark institution because it offered a 
truth which transcended opinion. It became 
an anchor for public activity. It became an 
institution to which the state could refer 
for decision-making. Admittedly I do not 
doubt that the state did this when it suited 
its purposes, but in the process science be-
came a powerful and persuasive institution 
in its own right, taking full advantage of this 
financing and symbolic influence.
 
When we look, for example, at 19th cen-
tury literature, it is usually engineers who 
represent a science which knows nature 
and guides society towards progress. Let 
me clarify by referring back to a text from 
childhood, at least for the French among us, 
L’île mystérieuse by Jules Verne. This novel, 
as you might remember, is about the arrival 
of small group of runaways from the United 
States on an island they believed to be de-
serted - although Captain Nemo is in fact 
beneath it - and the means which they use 
to develop their colony agriculturally and in-
dustrially. Starting from scratch, they build 
a whole civilization. However, there is more 
to the novel than this. It is a description of 
the ideal polity envisaged by the scientist 
Cyrus Smith, the only person capable of 
saying what needs to be done and how to 
go about it. This polity which he builds on 
the island develops without any setbacks 
and technology is never found wanting. No 
negative impact ever comes from technical 
developments. The struggle to control na-
ture progresses without any harmful effects 
- and no dialogue is therefore required. In 
fact in this book, there is no debate and in a 
profound sense there is no need for demo-
cracy. 
What I would now like to demonstrate is 
how dangerous Jules Verne’s model is and 
how this utopia will not help us to under-
stand real problems, particularly those of 
the 21st century in which no player, whether 
it be science or the state, can claim to have 
the best and safest answer. Nowadays, we 
live in a society where science and tech-
nology play a central, decisive role, where 
the wonders of invention are being used in 
ever more sophisticated products. But this 
knowledge and these technologies have not 
to be alone in deciding for our future. The 
social sphere feels entitled to voice an opi-
nion on the technological agenda and this is 
an inevitable development of our contempo-
rary, democratic society. 
today’s world: science, liberalism 
and ‘civil society’
 
The main historic tensions which I have 
been mentioning since the start of this 
lecture have not disappeared. On the con-
trary, they are even more pronounced to-
day because technoscience has developed 
its ability to intervene to an extraordinary 












degree, because their negative impacts 
seem to have increased, because the libe-
ral economy has regained influence and has 
altered the traditional balance between 
open science and private science, and be-
cause members of civil society are asserting 
their rights and their desire for autonomy 
more clearly than ever before. What I would 
now like to do is to take a few minutes to 
specify what these recent changes are and 
to indicate what we will be faced with in the 
future.
 Firstly, the dominant science, disciplines 
and values in the scientific arena have chan-
ged. In the 20th century, up until the 1980s, 
physics set the standards for good science, 
steered political decisions and made its sym-
bolic mark on society. Since the 1980s, it is 
primarily the life sciences, biotechnology, 
which have taken over this role, and these 
sciences can recombine and optimize biolo-
gical material and human material. Scientific 
practice has also been restructured through 
the use of IT and large-scale simulation, as 
is the case in the study of climate change. 
New scientific fields have emerged focusing 
on the issue of equilibrium on earth, risk ma-
nagement, biodiversity and ecological engi-
neering issues. All these things are extre-
mely new compared with the great scientific 
discoveries of the past. However, the social 
and political consequences of these changes 
are enormous. These changes are unprece-
dented. One needs only to think of human 
cloning, which will inevitably be a very sen-
sitive issue in the near future.
The second aspect brings a second 
change – the emergence of a new political 
and moral knowledge economy in recent 
years. We all know that the rules governing 
production and finance have changed in re-
cent years. Overall, power has shifted, in a 
word, from managers to shareholders. Poli-
tically speaking, we have moved from a uni-
verse that was regulated within the frame- 
work of balanced nations through elec-
ted bodies defining priorities collectively 
to worldwide, if not global, systems, regu- 
lated in very varied areas of governance 
by a large number of players - large corpo- 
rations, the World Bank, agencies of all 
kinds, a plethora of NGOs, etc. At the end 
of the day, this whole system would seem to 
be in a permanent state of flux, of constant 
change without any stable landmarks - in 
contrast, perhaps paradoxically, to the 
feeling of predictability and balance which 
existed in the Cold War era. 
The result is a extremely vague but never- 
theless persistent feeling of uncertainty. 
This shift which can be termed global, libe-
ral, and predominantly financial, was accom- 
panied by a transformation in the way in 
which knowledge is produced, in particular, 
but not exclusively, in universities. More and 
more interested parties have become in- 
volved in the research field. Venture capi-
tal, pension funds, NASDAQ, start-ups and 
business lawyers are all now decisive fac-
tors in American universities, for exam-
ple, alongside the military and the state, 
of course, which have not disappeared. They 











have assumed a decisive role when it comes 
to steering research - the form which it takes, 
what is studied and what is forgotten. 
For its part, industrial research has freed 
itself from the territorial boundaries of uni-
versities and populations. Localisation of 
industrial research is now established on 
a global scale according to potential and 
opportunities. There have been significant 
changes in research within companies too. 
Innovation processes have changed. Pro-
duct and generic brand design, and less 
R&D (Research and Development), have 
become the cornerstone of innovation. Re-
search more often than not has become an 
outsourcable parameter, as they say today, 
except in some sectors such as the pharma-
ceutical industry. Finally, definitions of the 
rules of property, intellectual property and 
patents, have been radically modified since 
the 80s. This has led to a fragmentation of 
knowledge on the one hand and to forms of 
monopoly and legalization of knowledge on 
the other hand. In short, a new political and 
moral knowledge economy has established 
itself at the heart of what are often incor-
rectly termed knowledge economies or so-
cieties.
Finally, the one last change which I would 
like to mention is that of society itself. These 
changes are visible in the composition of 
society, with the virtual disappearance of 
blue-collar workers in developed countries 
for example, as well as changes in subjecti-
vity, morals, lifestyles and relationships with 
authority, especially scientific authority. It 
could be said that our societies have be-
come radically heterogeneous and that what 
we are dealing with is greater individualism 
in the choice of path and benchmarks and in 
a variety of forms of self-fulfilment - hence 
the decline in the power of traditional insti-
tutions such as school and the family. These 
changes were accompanied by a huge rise in 
inequality, a new-found harshness in social 
relationships, a greater polarization between 
the loss of opportunity for the most disad-
vantaged, at one end of the spectrum, and 
a reappraisal of social and financial success 
at the other. The corollary, moreover, is a 
possible decline in the appeal of poorly paid 
research positions. 
science in society, society in 
science: How to pose problems 
today 
The consequences of these changes vis-
à-vis science are numerous and it would be 
irresponsible in my opinion to ignore them. 
Firstly, the belief in beneficial and control- 
lable scientific progress has been eroded. 
The decisions of experts who work in iso-
lation from the world are challenged. These 
changes which all become widespread, have 
been accelerated by the speed of technolo-
gical renewal, from GM crops to biotechno-
logy for humans, and by environmental cri-
ses and lack of transparency in new modes 












of governance. Environmental NGOs and 
patient groups have grown in number. La-
boratory associations have appeared, flou-
ting official certification procedures. They 
undertake monitoring and checking campai-
gns. And complaints are systematically filed 
with the courts. As we all know, whether we 
like it or not, they are here to question the 
fairness of scientific or political choices. 
I would also like to emphasize that the 
Web leads to alternative forms of trai-
ning and alternative relationships between 
knowledge and its evaluation, to alternative 
ways of producing and consuming science. 
The Web, which is radically polycentric, ex-
cludes hierarchical channels for dissemina-
ting knowledge and therefore undermines 
the authority of science.
 
In some academic circles, perhaps not in 
this auditorium, I have observed and conti-
nue to do so on a fairly frequently basis, a 
tendency to disregard these new realities 
and to think of them as superficial, tempo-
rary or abnormal, or as something which 
scientific culture and technology will cure. 
There are often fairly similar assessments 
in economic and political circles, terrified by 
the GM crop episode and by what they see 
as the unfounded technophobia of our age 
or a rejection of progress. 
This reductive approach is a mistake in 
my opinion, a refusal to take into account 
more complex challenges and realities invol-
ving all sorts of people, including the most 
creative and educated, and is something 
which can only become more widespread. 
It is also too simplistic to talk of distrust of 
science or even more so of the emergence 
of a new irrationalism. Actually it is predo-
minantly the success of industrial techno- 
science and the enthusiasm it arouses 
which are in the balance, not science itself 
or science as knowledge. My feeling is that 
these attitudes are actually a sign of great 
maturity. 
One can moreover put forward the point, 
which is obvious to anyone when you have 
studied two and a half centuries of history, 
that caution (or ‘sustainability’) is often the 
direct product of popular rejection of the 
negative effects of progress. Challenging 
negative consequences of progress leads 
and has led the judiciary, administrations 
and producers to redefine standards and to 
invent more protective and cautious stan-
dards. As a result, it is important to listen 
to society when it speaks, because it often 
functions as an effective warning system.
normative attitudes to Guide 
reFlection and action
So how should we proceed? How should 
we frame our thinking for the future? Firstly, 
by recognizing that the world is inherently 
complex and that there is no simple recipe. 
By recognizing particularly that historic ten-











sions which I have mentioned between the 
market-driven innovative approach and the 
willingness to address problems through dia-
logue, between techno-industrial change and 
negative environmental or social impacts, or 
between the individualistic approach of self-
fulfilment and the need for common legis-
lation will not disappear. Paraphrasing the 
great philosopher, Paul Ricœur, I could say 
that a democracy is not a political regime 
without contradiction or conflict, but only a 
regime in which solutions are open and can 
be negotiated. In a democracy, a conflict 
is not an accident and it is not a disaster. 
Paul Ricœur continues: “It is the expression 
of public good which cannot be decided on 
scientific grounds. Political discussion is in-
conclusive”. By which he means there is no 
logical conclusion “even if it might lead to a 
decision.” 
These facts that I have mentioned should 
not prevent us from acting, even though 
they should inspire caution. I would like 
to make four simple propositions, some of 
which refer to what has already been said in 
this auditorium.
 
First I think we should recognize as a 
truth and as a vital necessity in normative 
terms the variety of values, human plans, 
and knowledge, bearing in mind what Heinz 
Wismann said yesterday morning. I suggest 
we should campaign on behalf of this radical 
diversity, to actively maintain this biodiver-
sity of knowledge and values, because it lies 
at the heart of democratic life and guaran-
tees that we will adjust better in the future. 
Scientific knowledge will certainly remain 
the hard core of the galaxy of knowledge 
but it will have to learn to be modest once 
more and to be wary of hubris (pride and 
excess in ancient Greek) which is often a 
feature of its relationship with producers of 
technology.
This first move presupposes learning to 
listen to dialogue and engage in it – and this 
is my second proposition. Or to put it an-
other way, it involves realizing that there are 
still a lot of things which we do not know and 
which science does not know, learning not 
to be too self-focused and studying the blind 
spots in our constructs which other people 
sometimes correctly point out. However, we 
must not be ecumenical and - this is where it 
gets really complicated - we have to realize 
that power and clearly understood interests 
will necessarily disrupt this dialogue. The 
dialogue could be manipulated, for example. 
There are many examples of this over the 
last three decades. It is essential that every- 
body should take part in the conversation 
and decision-making when it is acting as 
communal training vehicle, but it has to be 
protected constantly because it is weak in 
the face of ordinary power relationships and 
its success is always extremely fragile. 
Therefore, beyond the often over sim-
plistic discourse of good governance, it is 
necessary - and this is my third proposal - 
to learn how to make choices again, to un-
der-stand once again the need for choices 












and the difficulty of making them. We must 
not simply engage in discussion in the hope 
to reach consensus, as that is quite rare, but 
in order to learn the importance of a deci-
sion made in full knowledge of the negative 
effects which it cannot fail to have. Choosing 
and deciding is by definition painful. We are 
rarely ever in a win-win situation and choice 
often means recognizing the negative conse-
quences of that choice and then spreading 
them out. Adapting successfully to climate 
change, for example, will necessarily have 
a price and consequences for certain life- 
styles. Unless, in keeping with the traditional 
understanding of progress, we still believe 
that quasi-magical science will always find 
an answer absolving us of any real duty to 
adapt, which I believe would be an illusion.
 
Therefore, we have to relearn how to or-
ganize dialogue and make choices. But espe-
cially, and this will be my last point, we have 
to learn how to think in broad terms and to 
try to tackle the most difficult problems and 
offer inventive solutions. We do not sim-
ply need to clarify procedural solutions to 
be implemented, although I do emphasize 
that we need to review them systematically 
and make them available, but we also need 
to generate substantive solutions rather 
than procedural ones. I would like to raise 
two difficult issues purely to illustrate this. 
What is the nature of our relationship with 
diseases and death, given that increased 
spending on health is unsustainable in the 
long term and will soon exceed our revenue? 
This is quite clear if we plot the graph. Se-
condly, how do we view common property? 
For instance, is the air common property? 
Is biodiversity common property? Is know- 
ledge common property? What about our 
view of common property and how to define it 
in legal terms, since evidence would suggest 
that we cannot think through some of our 
problems without it.
I will end my thoughts here, well aware 
of how trivial they are and especially of the 
extent to which they repeat what has been 
said in previous discussions. I hope, however, 
that we have been able to see eye to eye 
one or two points. Thank you.
